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Counterterrorism efforts have seen an 
increasing demand all over the world. Given the 
increasingly sophisticated detection equipment, 
terrorists chose between two options: surpass 
authorities at technological level or revert to 
simple techniques that outwit detection abilities. 
Tendencies show that they incline to choose the 
second option. It is not only cheaper to produce 
“bombs in the kitchen of one’s mum”, but when 
taking into account the accessability, detectability 
and transportability of conventional military 
equipment, it is the only “logical” way to a 
global jihad. While counterterrorist authorities 
are thinking about the next phase of “arms race”, 
a similarily important question is the increased 
use of the simple equipment on a global level. In 
the field of prevention, the simpler a weapon, the 
harder it is to detect. In this article, my aim is not 
to give ideas to future fighters, but to highlight 
the issue of low-cost attacks.
Keywords: terrorism, terror attacks, 
bombings, knife-attack, Al-Qaeda, IS.
Introduction
In the 1990s and early 2000s, jihadist fighters 
in Europe operated in groups and planned bomb 
attacks with certain types of explosives. Their 
ideological link to the “mother cell” was strong, 
they mostly had prior incidents in connection 
with their beliefs and their incompatibility 
with1the mainstream social norms. Financing 
and preparing the past decade’s incidents were 
mostly long-planned, in recent years, however, 
more terrorists have worked as a “lone wolf”, 
separated geographically and logistically from the 
organisations’ main area of operation. Moreover, 
it can be seen, that they frequently used a broader 
repertoire of weapons besides bombs, including 
knives, axes and handguns as well2. As it is written 
in the first publication of Al Qaeda’s Inspire 
1 Defence Viewpoints, Terrorism from Sun Tzu onwards 
– Part 1, 2009, available at http://www.defenceview 
points.co.uk/articles-and-analysis/terrorism-from-sun-tzu-
onwards-part-1, accessed on 20.03.2017.
2 Petter Nesser, Anne Stenersen, The Modus Operandi of 
Jihadi Terrorists in Europe, Perspectives on Terrorism, 
2014, available at http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/
pt/index.php/pot/article/view/388/html, accessed on 
07.02.2017.
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magazine in 2010, terrorist organizations aim to 
broaden the apparatus of applicable weapons, in 
order to reduce the dependence of individuals to 
the main logistics system.
In 2010, Al Qaeda inspired its followers 
with the following sentences: “Can I make an 
effective bomb that causes damage to the enemy 
from ingredients available in any kitchen in 
the world? The answer is yes”3. Followingly, it 
teaches various methods for making an explosive 
device. The instructions are clear, the ingredients 
cost next to nothing. Facing the issue of these 
hardly controllable processes, both counterterror 
agencies and leaders expressed their concern for 
the poor detectability of future terror plots. 
Former President Barack Obama addressed 
the nation in 2015 on domestic and international 
terrorism, claiming: “Over the last few years, 
however, the terrorist threat has evolved into 
a new phase. As we have become better at 
preventing complex, multifaceted attacks like 
9/11, terrorists turn to less complicated acts of 
violence like the mass shootings that are all too 
common in our society. It is this type of attack 
that we saw at Fort Hood in 2009, in Chattanooga 
earlier this year and now in San Bernardino. As 
groups like IS grew stronger amidst the chaos of 
war in Iraq and then Syria, and as the Internet 
erases the distance between countries, we see 
growing effort by terrorists to poison the minds 
of people like the Boston Marathon bombers and 
the San Bernardino killers”4. 
Al-Qaeda has been instrumental in shaping 
the threat from Jihadi terrorism in Europe, but 
as of 2014, new and powerful actors were on the 
rise. At the same year with the Obama speech, 
in 2015, FBI Director James Comey added, that 
“it’s not the al Qaeda of old. The al Qaeda of 
old was interested in the multipronged, national 
landmark-based, careful, long-planned attack 
with carefully vetted operatives. We still face 
3 Al Qaeda, Inspire, Issue 1, 2010, p. 33. available 
athttps://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2010/06/aqap-
inspire-magazine-volume-1-uncorrupted.pdf, accessed on 
09.02.2017.
4 Youtube, Obama Addresses Nation On Terrorism - 
Full Speech, available at https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=r88oQkL0Ocg, accessed on 09.02.2017.
that challenge, but the Al Qaeda of old was very 
different of what we see today. (…) IS thinks 
about their territory in a different way. They’re 
not focused on landmark multipronged, long 
tail event. He want people to be killed in their 
name”5. 
The editors of a special edition of the al 
Qaeda’s on-line magazine, Inspire, boast that 
what they call “Operation Hemorrhage”6 was 
cheap and easy. “Two Nokia phones, $150 
each, two HP printers, $300 each, plus shipping, 
transportation and other miscellaneous expenses 
add up to a total bill of $4,200. That is all what 
Operation Hemorrhage cost us. (…) On the other 
hand this supposedly ‘foiled plot’, as some of 
our enemies would like to call [it], will without a 
doubt cost America and other Western countries 
billions of dollars in new security measures”. 
The magazine warned that future attacks will be 
“smaller, but more frequent”7. 
Based on the trends Petter Nesser and Anne 
Stenersen identified early in 2014, besides bomb 
attacks and armed assaults the most likely tactical 
innovation is a combination of several crude 
methods such as arson and small bomb attacks 
in the future operation of the organisation. This 
assumption was proven to be right. Moreover, 
there were also new tactics, which could not 
be seen in the repertoire of terrorism in Europe 
before. These tactics for instance include the 
vehicle-ramming, which was represented in the 
2015 Graz, and 2016 Nice and Berlin attacks. Such 
method was previously frequently implemented 
in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, vehicles were 
also used in another context (suicide car bombs) 
during the Afghan and Iraqi operations as well. 
Such attacks could be used to target locations 
where large numbers of people congregate, 
5 James Comey, Politics and Public Policy Today, 
July 30, 2015, available at https://archive.org/details/
CSPAN3_20150730_190000_Politics_and_Public_
Policy_Today/start/0/end/60, accessed on 09.03.2017.
6 In October 2010, jihadists were able to sneak bombs 
hidden in printer cartridges onto two cargo planes. Due to 
strong intelligence efforts, authorities disabled both bombs 
before they were set to explode.
7 Al Qaeda, Inspire, Issue 3. 2011, pp. 4-17, available 
at https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2010/11/inspire-
magazine-3.pdf, accessed on 09.02.2017.
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while ramming offers terrorists with limited 
access to explosives or weapons an opportunity 
to conduct an attack with minimal prior training 
or experience8.
The simpler the attack, the harder to detect. 
Law enforcement forces and military units face 
the challenge of hardly identifyable targets and 
unpredictable places of attacks. Although, we 
might assume some kind of “primary” of those 
individuals with symbolic value or cultural 
institutes, that represents the main strategic 
locations in the Christian (or Western) culture, but 
when considering the prior motivations behind 
terrorist attacks, defining the targets become a 
difficult question. Jihadist individuals, following 
the radical ideology of organizations in Europe 
will prefer attacking sub-national communities 
rather than societies at large, in order to generate 
discomfort and instability9. Choosing the best 
location for a strike is still an important part of 
the tactical planning of radical organizations, but 
since the means and nature of global terrorism 
changed, the only basic assumptions we may 
stick to when trying to counter and prevent an 
incident are the motivations of radical attacks. 
These are:
Disseminating fear in the targeted •	
population, and in those who are neutral to the 
cause.
Assuring that the targeted groups reach •	
mass confusion.
Creating negative financial effect.•	
Generating political discomfort and •	
forcing government to change the policy.
Enhancing publicity, using the elements •	
of media.
Psychological effects: the “good •	
cause” versus the “bad”, legitimising ideas on 
conspiracy, acting in absence of remorse, “the 
herd instinct”10.
8 USA Department of Homeland Security (U//FOUO) 
DHS-FBI Warning: Terrorist Use of Vehicle Ramming 
Tactics, 2010, available at https://publicintelligence.net/
ufouo-dhs-fbi-warning-terrorist-use-of-vehicle-ramming-
tactics/, accessed on 09.02.2017.
9 Petter Nesser, Anne Stenersen, op.cit., 2014.
10 Sigmund Freud, Group Psychology and the Analysis of 
the Ego, Chapter IX. The Herd Instinct, 1922, available 
at http://www.bartleby.com/290/9.html, accessed on 
08.03.2017 and Maj. Guy Berry, “A Question of Sanity, 
Returnees may also bring new technologies 
and tactics to the European sphere, thereby the 
limitation and check of arriving individuals is a 
must. Since no good solution had been found to 
the prevention of the infiltration of radicals, in 
the conclusion, I aim to propose some countering 
steps for preventing their possibly to execute 
actions. In the light of the stability of the current 
societal structure and environment, we also have 
to concentrate on the problematics of the arriving 
individuals’ sectarian dimension of the attacks, 
targeting mostly Shias or Kurds. The most 
dangerous scenario is that IS or like-minded 
groups launch and execute a sporadic but intense 
campaign of international terrorism as a response 
to Western military involvement in the conflict11. 
1. The Declining Cost of Recruiting
Realising the efforts and achievements of 
modern terrorist propaganda, we have to evaluate 
our countering-radicalisation mechanisms. 
Although radicalism is not equal to terrorism, 
it is a preliminary step towards fundamentally 
motivated acts or preaches against targeted 
groups. To be effective in combating 
radicalisation and terrorism, it is needed to 
recognize that the nature and cost of inspiring 
and radicalising individuals changed in parallel 
with the modernisation of telecommunication 
and travel opportunities. 
Modern day preachers are not only found in 
safe heavens of the Balkans or the “no-go-zones” 
of France. They are able to take advantage of the 
reduced (or no) cost of internet, as well as the 
possibility to reach and instruct people by words 
from thousand kilometers.
The costs of propaganda increase in line with 
the improvement of the chosen future terrorist’s 
determination. During the first steps, online 
propaganda and personal contacts are satisfactory 
to strenghten the basic ideology in the individual. 
Concentrating on the costs of terrorism, we have 
to add that the basic needs for attracting and 
Invalidating Terrorism” available at https://www.academia.
edu/11050576/The_Sanity_of_Terrorism, accessed on 
08.02.2017.
11  Petter Nesser, Anne Stenersen, op.cit., 2014.
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recruiting young individuals or those who should 
provide sufficient resupply for the act of the 
organisations became inexpensive through the 
free modern media, internet and the cheap pieces 
of electronic equipment. On the other hand, it is 
clear that maintaining the extensive propaganda 
requires financial support. It is not the ways of 
transporting ideology, but the experts hired, the 
professional work and institutions set up that cost 
a fortune in this relevancy. 
In November 2014, a short film showing the 
beheading of 22 Syrian prisoners was published. 
Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium 
(TRAC), and the Quilliam Foundation think tank 
launched an investigation on the costs of the 
film and the results pointed out that since it was 
professionally recorded, including many hours 
of filming and professional editing, the cost of 
producing was about USD 200,00012. But as 
soon as military success decline, the organisation 
needs to adapt the changing financial structure 
and cut back on its expenditures. Thus, since 
August 2015, sums spent on propaganda are in 
sharp decline as well13.
While choosing vulnerable groups, experts 
determine risk factors that include psychological, 
social and economic details. Although, in terms 
of vulnerability, no general pattern clearly 
categorises their characteristics – supporters of 
radical organizations come from a wide range 
of social and economic backgrounds14 –, some 
basic risk factors might be in favour of terrorist 
organisations’ “HR specialists”. 
According to Fathali M. Moghaddam, 
radicalisation is a process with five stages (levels). 
Those at the lowest level experience relative 
12 Gabi Siboni, Daniel Cohen, Tal Koren, “The Islamic 
State’s Strategy in Cyberspace” in Military and Strategic 
Affairs, Volume 7, No. 1, p. 132. Available at http://www.
inss.org.il/uploadImages/systemFiles/7_Siboni_Cohen_
Koren.pdf, accessed on 08.03.2017.
13 Scott Shane, “IS Media Output Drops as Military Pressure 
Rises, Report Says”, 2016, available at https://www.
nytimes.com/2016/10/11/world/middleeast/islamic-state-
media-propaganda-IS.html?_r=0, accessed on 08.03.2017.
14 Randy Borum, “Assessing Risk for Terrorism 
Involvement” in Journal of Threat Assessment and 
Management, American Psychological Association, 2015, 
Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 63–87, available at https://www.apa.org/
pubs/journals/ features/tam-tam0000043.pdf, accessed on 
08.03.2017.
poverty and limited social mobility, which is 
associated with pressure from the hostility and 
oppression of society mainstream. Stepping 
upwards on the phases, perception of exclusion is 
further strengthened. It is followed by the support 
of the radical ideology, the categorization of 
enemies and ultimately the execution of terrorist 
act. The author points out that individuals rarely 
reach the fifth (actual execution of terrorist acts) 
phase15, 16.
When reaching higher levels of radicalisation, 
terrorist organisations are forced to attract 
supporters by materialistic means. Although 
economic motivation is just one of the long list of 
reasons that may inspire individuals for joining 
radical organisations it is a key element when it 
comes to maintaining the human power of the 
radical forces. Thereby, radical organisations – 
such as al Qaeda or the Islamic State (IS) – have 
millions of monthly salary expenditures. 
According to the estimates of the Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF), in 2015, the IS 
reportedly payed its fighters on average 350-500 
USD per month determined by several factors, 
including their particular skills and nationality. 
Multiplied with the estimated number of fighters 
in its employ (20-30 thousand), this alone would 
represent a monthly 10 million USD expenditure. 
Of course, we also have to take into account 
those suicide bombers whose deep committment 
towards terrorist actions make specific operations 
(relatively) free. In addition to the salary, IS is 
also reported to provide stipend for each family 
member of a fighter and regular payments to the 
families of members killed or captured17. Since 
the operational territory shrank and the number 
15 Nóra Pákozdi, György Nógrádi, “The significance of 
family connections during the process of radicalisation” in 
Honvédségi Szemle 2016/4.
16 Fathali M., Moghaddam, “The Staircase to Terrorism 
– A Psychological Exploration” in Randy Borum (ed.): 
Radicalization into Violent Extremism II: A Review of 
Conceptual Models and Empirical Research, Journal of 
Strategic Security, Volume 4, Winter 2011, p. 40, available 
at http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? 
article=1140&context=jss, accessed on 08.03.2017.
17 FATF, Financing of the terrorist organisation Islamic 
State in Iraq and the Levant (IS), 2015, pp. 29-30. available 
at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/
Financing-of-the-terrorist-organisation-IS.pdf, accessed 
on 08.03.2017.
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of the fighters reduced significantly, IS gradually 
reduced its payment for “employees”18.
2. Choosing the Target
Planning and executing a terrorist plot 
requires deep knowledge about the to-be-attacked 
environment. By focusing on discriminate 
targets, organisations could not only specify 
their interest, gain supporters and shed light on 
the preferred and available methods, but also 
a “well chosen” target may reduce the costs of 
an attack. Such an approach was mentioned in 
connection with the al Qaeda’s shift towards 
directed, ‘strategic terrorism’ in a publication 
by Peter R. Neumann and M. L. R. Smith in the 
Journal of Strategic Studies, which implies that 
terrorist groups will eventually shift away from 
indiscriminate violence with mass-casualties and 
18 Agence-France Presse and Reuters, “Islamic State to 
halve fighters’ salaries as cost of waging terror starts to bite”, 
available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/
jan/20/islamic-state-to-halve-fighters-salaries-as-cost-of-
waging-terror-starts-to-bite, accessed on 08.03.2017. and 
Josie Ensor, ”IS stops paying Mosul fighters’ salaries in hint 
at funding shortage”, available at http://www.telegraph.
co.uk/news/2017/01/05/IS-stops-mosul-fighters-salaries-
just-battle-city-intensifies/, accessed on 08.03.2017.
move towards activities designed to boost the 
group’s legitimacy19.
Financial assets of a given terrorist group 
should assign some indicators on preferred types 
of targets. Al Qaeda and its affiliates have the 
ability to mobilize a huge group of financial 
donors, besides, the amount of their income is 
still higher than younger militias or other terror 
organisations. 
After the 9/11 attack on the United States, 
international community’s efforts against 
“traditional” terror plots inspired radical groups 
to implement a change of attitude. Targeting 
military or police forces were frequent, but the 
amount of soft target attacks were still the most 
common (see: Figure no.1 and no. 2) in Europe 
and the MENA20region. 
19 Peter R. Neumann, M. L. R. Smith, “Strategic 
terrorism: The framework and its fallacies” in Journal 
of Strategic Studies, 28: 4, pp. 571-595, 2012, available 
at https://reassessingcounterinsurgency.files.wordpress.
com/2012/02/rainsborough-strategy-of-terrorism-its-
framework-and-its-fallacies.pdf, accessed on 13.03.2017
20 Data from the Global Terrorism Database, Search 
criteria: between 2001-2015, all incidents regardless of 
doubt, region: Western Europe; Eastern Europe; Middle 
East & North Africa.
Figure no. 1: Target types of terrorist incidents in the MENA region 
and Europe in-between 2001-201520
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21
21 Ibidem.
22
22 Data from the Global Terrorism Database, Search 
Figure no. 2: Frequency of terror attacks in the MENA region and Europe, 
by target in-between 2001-201521
Figure no. 3: Target types of terrorist incidents in the MENA region and Europe 
between 2001-201522
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On 21 May 2016, IS-linked al-Furqan Media 
released a speech by Abu Muhammed al-Adnani, 
in which he called on Muslims to dedicate holy 
month of Ramadan (6 June – 5 July 2016) to 
jihad, to kill unbelievers by any means available 
to them in their place of residence, should they 
be prevented by the ‘tyrannical system’ (Western 
governments) from joining IS in the territory 
under its control. He further highlighted the 
importance of civilian targets since, according to 
him, even the smallest acts to terrorise unbelievers 
in the West have a big impact, the aim is to fill the 
lives of Westerners with terror so ‘the neighbour 
fears his neighbour’23. Similarily, according to 
the evaluation of the FBI, civilian targets were 
primarily aimed by terrorist attacks in the United 
States as well24.
Threats and hoaxes against military personnel 
and facilities remained frequent. Moreover, there 
has been an increased tendency to target military 
personnel after 2008. Such incidents were the 
criteria: between 2001-2015, all incidents regardless of 
doubt, region: Western Europe; Eastern Europe; Middle 
East & North Africa.
23 Paul Kamolnick, “Abu Muhammad al-Adnani’s May 
21, 2016 Speech”, Small Wars Journal, 2016, available at 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/abu-muhammad-al-
adnani%E2%80%99s-may-21-2016-speech, accessed on 
17.03.2017.
24 FBI, Increase in Number and Diversity of Terrorist Plots 
Against the United States Since 9/11, 2011, available at 
https://leb.fbi.gov/2011/september/image/terrorist-plot 
-diversity-chart/image_view_fullscreen, accessed on 
23.02.2017.
Kosovar Arid Uka’s attack against a shuttle bus 
carrying U.S. soldiers at Frankfurt international 
airport in March 2011, followed by Mohammed 
Merah’s killing spree in France in March 2012, 
and the soldier stabbings in the U.K. and France 
in 201325. In February, 2017, Abdullah Reda 
Refaei al-Hamamy took arms (a machete) against 
France’s soldiers and police officers26. 27
The advantage of soft targets can be found 
in many aspects. Jihadi are still interested in 
targeting crowded areas, even if they do not seem 
to target public transportation and airplanes as 
often as before28. While reducing costs, terrorist 
organisations must count on the additional costs 
of countering security personnel and security 
equipment systems as well. Soft targets are easily 
accessible, which also mean that the number of 
casualties could be higher than in a separated 
area. 
3. Cost of Preparations
Although the cost of recruitment and planning 
were reduced significantly by the informational 
revolution and the modern technology of the 21st 
century, stabile financial background is still a 
25 Petter Nesser, Anne Stenersen, 2014.
26 The Local France, “Louvre machete attack just latest 
to target soldiers and police in France”, 2017, available at 
https://www.thelocal.fr/20170203/islamist-attacks-against-
police-and-soldiers-in-france, accessed on 13.03.2017.
27 Ibidem.
28 Petter Nesser, Anne Stenersen, 2014.
Figure no. 4: Frequency of terror attacks in the MENA region and Europe, 
by target between 2001-201527
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need for executing a terrorist attack on European 
soil. Tendencies show that in parallel with the 
increase in attacks on civilian targets, jihadists 
tend to use cheaper tactics, while maintaining 
(or even aggregating) the amount of victims with 
the well-chosen time and place. This tendency 
raises the question of the controllability and 
detectability of terrorist plans, since monitoring 
the national or international flow of conventional 
weaponry only contributes to the reduction of 
possible attempts. Due to the increased usage of 
home-made or non-conventional equipment, a 
new era of counter-terrorism operations began. 
In the following paragraphs, we shall 
concentrate on the changes in methods of attacks, 
while in the next section. 
Considering the unplannable scenarios, 
operatives of terrorist groups must be backed 
with additional reserves while preparing and 
implementing actions. One of the July 2005 
suicide bombers in London, a 22-year-old part-
time worker at a fish-and-chips shop left an estate 
worth $240,000 after he blew up a subway train. 
Neither his family nor authorities could explain 
from where he got the money. We also have to take 
into account those previously donor individuals 
who got enough financial resources not to be 
dependent only on the central logistics system. 
For example, Abdelhamid Abaaoud, the Belgian-
Moroccan radical who took part in the Paris terror 
attack, was relatively well-off, lived and studied 
in an upper-middle class environment. 
Many of the terrorist plots were primarily 
planned to be cheap, others happened to be 
executed cheaper than planned. In Spain, the cell 
responsible for the March 2004 train bombings 
in Madrid needed $80,000 to finance the plot, 
according to Spanish court documents. But they 
had access to more than $2,3 million worth of 
hashish and other illegal drugs that they could 
have sold to raise more money, the documents 
showed29. 
Similarily, many of the al-Qaeda’s executed 
attacks were over-budgeted, sourcing from 
29 Craig Whitlock, “Al-Qaeda Masters Terrorism On the 
Cheap”, Washington Post Foreign Service, 2008, available 
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/arti 
cle/2008/08/23/AR2008082301962.html, accessed on 
07.03.2017
Islamic charities and the use of well-placed 
financial facilitators who gathered money from 
donors, primarily in the Gulf region. In the 
Analysis of John Roth, Douglas Greenburg and 
Serena Wille is claimed, that prior to 9/11 the 
largest single al Qaeda expense was support for 
the Taliban, besides Bin Laden also used money 
to train operatives in camps in Afghanistan, 
create terrorist networks and alliances and 
support the jihadists and their families. Finally, 
a relatively small amount of money was used to 
finance operations, including the approximately 
$400,000–500,000 spent on the September 11 
attacks, $10,000 for the 1998 bombings of U.S. 
embassies in Africa; and approximately $20,000 
for the 2002 Bali bombings30,31. An NBC analysis 
of the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993 
showed it similarily cost just $20,00032.
Terrorist networks and embeddedness play a 
crucial role in expenses of a terrorist organisation. 
In a 2002 interview Salah Shehada, the founder of 
Hamas’s Qassam Brigades claimed that a terrorist 
operation could cost $3,500. A Hezbollah member 
has noted that it cost between $665 and $1,105 to 
conduct a terrorist attack. Other estimates for the 
cost of Palestinian terrorist attacks range from 
$150 to $50,00033.
4. Precedents for Low-Budget Attacks
4.1.  Bombings
Methods changed from precision to 
effectiveness, from detailed plans to relatively 
cheap execution. Bombings are still common type 
30 Petter Nesser, Anne Stenersen, op. cit., 2014.
31 John Roth, Douglas Greenburg, Serena Wille, 
Monograph on Terrorist Financing, National Commission 
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, available at 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff_statements/911_
TerrFin _Monograph.pdf, accessed on 23.02.2017.
32 Robert Windrem, “IS Is the World’s Richest Terror 
Group, But Spending Money Fast”, CNBC, 2015, available 
at http://www.cnbc.com/2015/03/20/IS-the-worlds-richest-
terror-group-is-spending-money-fast.html, accessed on 
23.02.2017.
33 Joshua Prober, Accounting for Terror: Debunking 
the Paradigm of Inexpensive Terrorism, Policy #1041, 
2005, available at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/
policy-analysis/view/accounting-for-terror-debunking-
the-paradigm-of-inexpensive-terrorism, accessed on 
07.03.2017.
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of terrorist act, including typically, improvised 
explosive devices, which are inexpensive and 
easy to make. This shift towards homemade 
weaponry for terrorist activity on European 
territory already began at the July 7, 2005, London 
transit bombings, when the ABC News aired 
photographs of bombs found in one attacker’s car, 
made from glass bottles packed with explosives 
and nails. Components that were – according to 
the al-Qaeda’s initiative – made from household 
materials34. Home-Made Explosives have 
become more common after 2008, considering 
the “Nicky Reilly” (2008), “Mohammed 
Game” (2009), “Underwear bomber” (2009), 
“Doukajev” (2010), “Abdulwahab Stockholm” 
(2010), “Kosher Supermarket” (2012) executed 
attacks35.
Few days after the London bombings in July 
2005, terror hit the UK’s capital again, but the 
plot to detonate four bombs was foiled. Quoting 
The Economist, “The young men who tried 
but failed to detonate homemade bombs on 
London’s transport system on July 21 packed 
explosives into cheap plastic containers… 
34 Jeff Edwards, Ryan Parry, “16 more bombs”, Mirror, 
2005, available at http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-
news/16-more-bombs-551710, accessed on 14.03.2017.
35 Petter Nesser, Anne Stenersen, 2014.
the sort of things that housewives use to store 
leftover curry”36. The most frequently used types 
of bombs are TATP (Triacetonate Triperoxide), 
ANFO (ammonium nitrate and fuel oil), TNT, 
HMTD (C6H12N4, hydrogen peroxide, citric 
acid), and C-4 based explozives. 
According to a Palestinian official, the 
following elements are needed for an effective 
attack: a young, healthy man/woman, nails, gun 
powder (explosive), a switch, mercury (accessible 
from thermometers) and acetone37. 38
Although it seems easy to collect, 
thermometers with mercury were banned from 
commercial market of the EU in 2011 and 
restricted in other parts of the world (Philippines, 
Australia, and the USA) as well39. According to 
36 The Economist, Looking in the wrong places, 2005, 
available at http://www.economist.com/node/5053373, 
accessed on 14.03.2017.
37 S. Atran, “The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide 
Terrorism” in The Washington Quarterly, 29, no. 2:69, p. 
1537. 2003.
38 Counter Terrorism Guide, Methods & Tactics, available 
at https://www.nctc.gov/site/methods.html#sarin, accessed 
on 07.03.2017
39 European Chemicals Agency, Background document to 
the opinions on the Annex XV dossier proposing restrictions 
on Mercury in measuring devices, available at https://echa.
europa.eu/documents/10162/20f4ee0a-6bcf-4ed0-a271-
6674cd333710, accessed on 16.03.2017.
Table no. 1: Estimated cost of a fragmentation bomb. The estimates above are enough 
for approximately four suicide vest38
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the estimates of Marie-Helen Maras, preparing 
a bomb costs no more than $15040. Taking into 
account the ingredients, this low sum can be 
accepted. Below there are represented some 
estimates about three types of explosives.41
We also have to add that in countries without 
current war environment, additional costs should 
be added to the preparation. Testing the perfect 
amount of mixtures, the reaction of these unstable 
materials to natural changes (for example heat) is 
needed, thereby a testing facility or territory is also 
a must for a bomb attack.
Quoting the manual on Latin-American 
guerilla warfare of the Brazilian Marxist, Carlos 
Marighella, we should agree that modern 
40 Marie-Helen Maras, A terrorizmus elmélete és gyakorlata, 
Antall József Tudásközpont Tankönyvműhely, Budapest. 
2016, p. 399.
41 Estimates of the author, based on prices of ingredients, 
costs available on the internet.
strategies of terrorism have a long history both 
on precedents and ideologies, all over the world. 
According to Marighella, “Terrorism is an action, 
usually involving the placement of an explosive 
or firebomb of great destructive power, which is 
capable of effecting irreparable loss against the 
enemy. Terrorism requires that the urban guerrilla 
should have adequate theoretical and practical 
knowledge of how to make explosives. (…) 
Terrorism42is a weapon43the revolutionary can 
never relinquish”44.
42 Estimates of the author, based on prices of ingredients, 
costs available on the internet (Gasoline price estimate - 
Hungary – 1,29 USD/liter).
43 Estimates of the author, based on prices of ingredients, 
costs available on the internet.
44 Carlos Marighella, Terrorism, Minimanual of the Urban 
Guerrilla, 1969, available at https://www.marxists.org/
archive/marighella-carlos/1969/06/minimanual-urban-
guerrilla/ch30.htm, accessed on 15.02.2017.
Table no. 2: Estimated cost of an ANFO bomb
Table no. 3: Estimated cost of a home-made “napalm-B” bomb
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In the recent years, the al-Qaeda had already 
prepared several free documents and know-
how-s on the preparation of an explosive, and the 
internet also decreases the cost of training future 
bombers45. Unlike guerilla warfare, the Palestinian 
radical organizations claim that suicide attacks 
were much more effective. According to a survey 
conducted in May 2002 among the Palestinian 
population, the second Intifada had more results 
for them than the previous years’diplomatic 
negotiations46.
The Paris (November 13, 2015) and Brussels 
(March 22, 2016) suicide bomb attacks47 have 
shown that terrorists are able to plan relatively 
complex attacks quickly, cheaply and effectively. 
In both series of attacks, international victims 
were aimed to be attacked (football stadium, 
metro station, an airport), thereby a multiplier 
effect generated worldwide media attention48. In 
addition to the human cost it paralyzed tourism, 
economy and social morale.
As jihadis continue to operate in conflict 
zones, it is likely that the repertoire of bomb-
making techniques will widen further. It is 
also likely that sophisticated internet sites will 
provide online learning techniques. However, 
in the short to medium-term, the innovations in 
bomb-making techniques in Europe will come 
as a result of training abroad, rather than online 
courses.49 While home-made explosives (HMEs) 
remain the most commonly used explosives in 
IEDs, explosive remnants of war (ERW) and 
illicit trafficking in explosives from former 
conflict areas present a significant threat to the 
EU50.
45 Benedek József Kis, Dzsihadizmus, radikalizmus, 
terrorizmus – A globális terrorizmus, Zrínyi Kiadó, 
Budapest, 2017, p.148.
46 Ibidem, p. 178.
47 The explosives used in the Paris and Brussels attacks 
were TATP (Triacetone Triperoxide).
48 Europol, “Changes in Modus Operandi of Islamic State – 
revised”, Europol Public Information, 2016, p.6. Available 
at https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/docu 
ments/modus_operandi_is_revisited.pdf, accessed on 
17.03.2017.
49 Petter Nesser, Anne Stenersen, op.cit., 2014.
50 Europol, 2016. p.13.
4.2. Knife and firearm attacks
Besides explosives, there has been a relative 
increase in knives and firearms attacks in recent 
years. Such terrorist attacks were represented in 
7.3% of plots during 2001–2007, and in 33% of 
plots after 2008. The number of plots involving 
knives and handguns increased by 26% after 
2008, while the number of bomb plots decreased 
by only 13% in the same period51.
The rise in knife and firearm plots is part 
of a more general trend towards diversification 
of attack types and choice of weapons among 
jihadis in Europe. Supporters of radical Islamist 
groups (considering mainly lone wolves) are 
more likely to prepare their attacks on a lower 
budget. The first call for such attacks was made 
by Abu Mohammed al-Adnani (the IS’s official 
spokesperson) in 2014 to kill Westerners in every 
possible ways. He ordered supporters to kill “non-
believers” in Western countries, saying: “If you 
can kill a non-believing American or European 
– especially the (…) French – or an Australian, 
or a Canadian, or any other non-believer from the 
non-believers waging war, including the citizens 
of the countries that entered into a coalition 
against the Islamic State, then rely upon Allah, 
and kill him in any manner or way however it 
may be. If you are not able to find an IED or a 
bullet, then single out the disbelieving American, 
Frenchman, or any of his allies. Smash his head 
with a rock, or slaughter him with a knife, or run 
him over with your car, or throw him down from 
a high place, or choke him, or poison him”52. 
In addition to the speech of Al-Adnani, 
supporters of IS were also given written help 
on the best ways for knife attacks. In the IS’s 
Rumiyah magazine’s 2nd issue, the author writes: 
“Knives, though certainly not the only weapon 
for inflicting harm upon the kuffar, are widely 
available in every land and thus readily accessible. 
They are extremely easy to conceal and highly 
lethal, especially in the hands of someone who 
knows how to use them effectively. Also, due 
51 Petter Nesser, Anne Stenersen, op.cit., 2014.
52 Counter Extremism Project, Abu Muhammad al-
Adnani, available at https://www.counterextremism.
com/ extremists/ abu-muhammad-al-adnani, accessed on 
07.03.2017
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to their accessibility, were a person to conduct 
a campaign of knife attacks, he could dispose of 
his weapon after each use, finding no difficulty in 
acquiring another one”53.
The first precedent for knife attacks was 
executed in 2010, when a Danish-Somali jihadi 
attempted to kill the cartoonist Kurt Westergaard 
with an axe (coded as knife in the dataset). Four 
years later, in the name of the IS, the 18 year-old 
Abdul Numan Haider stabbed two police officers 
in Melbourne (Australia) on 23 September 
2014. In 2015 and 2016, knife attacks became 
increasingly “popular”. In June 2016, Larossi 
Aballa Moroccan-born French migrant stabbed 
a policemen and his wife to death. One month 
later, in Würzburg, the 17 years old Afghan 
Muhammad Riyad attacked train passengers 
with an axe. On the 26th of July, in Normandia, 
Adel Kermiche and Abdel Malik Petitjean took 
hostages and killed the priest with a knife. The 
line of the 2016 knife attacks were continued by 
the Charleroi attacker, who killed two policemen 
with a machete. Besides, killings also took place 
in Reutlingen, where attacker wounded and killed 
a woman.
Al-Qaeda’s strategic leadership in the al-Sahab 
video “You are only responsible for yourself”, 
issued in June 2011, specifically encouraged 
Muslims in the West to carry out such attacks: 
“You can go down to a gun show at the local 
convention center and come away with a fully 
automatic assault rifle, without a background 
check and, most likely, without having to show 
an identification card.”54 Moussa Coulibaly took 
arms against French soldiers in front of a Jewish 
shop in Nice, wounding two officers. He later 
tried to travel to Syria, but had been turned back 
at the Istanbul airport55. 
53 IS, “Just Terror Tactics”, Rumiyah, 2016, p. 13, available 
at https://clarionproject.org/factsheets-files/Rumiyh-IS-
Magazine-2nd-issue.pdf, accessed on 17.03.2017.
54 Sudip Bhattacharya, Al Qaeda video resurfaces claiming 
how easy it is to buy guns in U.S., CNN, 2013, available at 
http://edition.cnn.com/2013/04/11/politics/al-qaeda-video/
index.html, accessed on 07.03.2017
55 BBC, “French soldiers wounded in Nice Jewish centre 
attack”, 2015, available at http://www.bbc.com/news/
world-europe-31118020, date of download: 07.03.2017 
and Global Terrorism Database, The incident occurred at 
Moreover, despite the increase in diverse 
cheaper equipment, automatic firearms still seem 
to be the weapons of choice of terrorist cells 
committing large scale attacks, because of their 
relative ease of access (mainly from the near 
neighborhood of Europe), use and effectiveness. 
The first such attack was the murder of the 
Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam 
in 2004. The assailant, Mohammed Bouyeri 
shot van Gogh numerous times with a semi-
automatic pistol, and subsequently tried to 
decapitate him. Firearms nowadays can be 
obtained from criminal sources, in some cases 
from those the terrorists already know from their 
own criminal past. In addition, it is possible to 
obtain firearm parts legally via the internet, as 
well as de-activated firearms to be converted 
back later for operational use. The current 
situation concerning the availability of weapons 
in countries neighbouring the EU, particularly in 
Ukraine and the Western Balkans and the MENA, 
may lead to a significant increase in weapons on 
the black market, posing a significant threat in 
the near future56.
4.3. Assassinations 
Although, in modern times, assassination lost 
from its “reputation”, the tactic is still used by 
nearly all terrorist groups. Assassination is mainly 
centered on the will for change in political-
military leadership, highlighted individuals 
such as public officials and religious or media 
representatives. 
Historically, terrorists have assassinated 
specific individuals for psychological effect57. 
Assassins were either near to the target 
individual, thus possessed a trustful environment 
where plots could easily be executed (for 
example concubines), or in the backstage, in order 
to distance themselves from the victim in every 
Massena Square, available at https://www.start.umd.edu/
gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=201502030092, 
accessed on 07.03.2017.
56 EUROPOL, TE-SAT, 2016. p.8, available at https://www.
europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/europol_ 
tesat_2016.pdf, accessed on 17.03.2017.
57 Brian P. Bennett, Understanding, Assessing, and 
Responding to Terrorism: Protecting Critical Infrastructure 
and Personnel, 2007, p. 131, available at https://goo.gl/
jvSLn1 accessed on 28.04.2017.
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possible ways. Assassination techniques were 
always diverse, including choking to death, 
poisoning or shooting. 
Even though in Europe we didn’t face 
such attacks in recent times, the possibility of 
assassination is still real. Modern-day famous 
assassinations’ list includes high ranking political 
officials (USA President John F. Kennedy, 
Russian Ambassador to Ankara Andrey Karlov, 
Russian opposition politician Boris Nemtsov) 
and also, concurrent family members (Kim Jong-
nam). 
Terrorist units are rather in favour of 
causing social disruption, thereby one-to-one 
assassinations are not the main elements of their 
repertoire in the European region. However, we 
still face the challenge of the assassination or 
kidnapping of foreigners in crisis zones, mainly 
people of the media (for example Kayla Mueller) 
or charities. Besides, concerning returning 
jihadists, the EUROPOL warns: “From an IS 
perspective, the terrorist attacks carried out in 
Belgium and France in 2015 and 2016 were 
successful and effective. Given this fact and a 
general assumption that IS retains both the will 
and the capability to strike again, further attacks 
in the EU, both by lone actors and groups, are 
likely to take place in the near future”. The 
EUROPOL also warns, that the modi operandi 
jihadists employ in Syria and Iraq, could be 
exported to the EU at some point. One example 
is the use of suicide bombings in the Paris and 
Brussels attacks in 2015 and 2016.58
4.4. Arson and Firebombing
Arson and firebombing are also easily 
conducted by terrorist groups59. Incendiary 
devices are as cheap as the knife-attacks, while 
ingredients can also be found “in everyone’s 
kitchen”. Between 1968 and 2005, 55 terrorist 
organizations can be named who, either solely 
or in combination with other devices, effectively 
applied fire during their attack. After 2005, in 
recent years, this tool earned a significantly 
growing importance in the arsenal of several 
58 Europol, op.cit., 2016, pp.3-6.
59 Terrorism Research, Types of Terrorist Incidents, 
available at http://www.terrorism-research.com/incidents/, 
accessed on 17.02.2017.
radical groups. Fire is an extremely powerful 
weapon that is hardly manageable, extinguishing 
it requires the involvement of high amount of 
personnel, and as long as flammable material is 
given, it is able to destroy everything.  It does not 
require long-term training, it is relatively low-
cost and can be carried out by a small number of 
people. In appropriate conditions (weather, wind, 
etc.) it has extremely high destructive ability 
since devices are given at the location, as well 
as extinguishing requires massive fire-fighter 
forces.
Examples on the combined use of fire in 
terrorism begins with the 2008 arson attempt 
against the China Southern Airlines CZ 6901 
plane, continues with the 2001, September 
11 attacks against the New York World Trade 
Center, the November 2008 Mumbai Taj Mahal 
Hotel attack and the 2012 siege on US diplomatic 
office in Benghazi in Libya. The method, which 
relies on the conventional equipment (firearms) 
combined with the use of fire is primarily an 
improved version of what had been implemented 
during the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, thereby 
European precedents of wildfires and arson 
attacks across can be seen as advanced successors 
of Palestinian and Israeli tactics.
Concentrating on Europe, in 2014, the 
Palestininan Abbas C. brought arson as a method 
of terrorism to the high importance. The 27-year-
old ambulance driver set fire to the Naouri kosher 
supermarket in Sarcelles, a heavily Jewish suburb 
of the French capital, on July 20th60. Al-Qaeda 
has been blamed for a recent series of forest fires 
across Europe. Alexander Bortnikov, official 
of the Russia’s Federal Security Service said, 
according to state news agency RIA Novosti, at a 
meeting of heads of security agencies61. Between 
January 1st and September 16th 2012, according to 
Spanish agriculture ministry, “more than 184,000 
hectares of land in Spain alone were destroyed by 
60 Forward, French Kosher Grocery Arsonist Gets 4 Years 
in Prison, 2014, available at http://forward.com/news/
breaking-news/208515/french-kosher-grocery-arsonist-
gets-4-years-in-pri/, accessed on 17.03.2017
61 Meira Svirsky, “Al-Qaeda Claims Responsibility for 
Starting Israel Fires”, Clarion Project, November 27, 
2016, available at https://clarionproject.org/al-qaeda-
claims-responsibility-starting-israel-fires/, accessed on 
17.04.2017.
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fires between the highest amounts in a decade, 
forced authorities to evacuate around 2,000 
people from their home62.
It is also an interesting addtition to the 
possible use the motivational issue towards fire 
arson, that it may help terrorist organisations 
back their actions and destroy evidence in an 
undetectable way. Last year (2016) in Belgium, 
Forensic Lab was set on fire by an individual, 
thereby the lab’s entire cache of hair samples 
and thousands of other pieces of evidence critical 
to the prosecution of hundreds of criminal and 
terrorism suspects were burned down63.
As the method seemed to be effective on the 
Palestinian scene, both Al-Qaeda and IS called on 
their supporters to join the jihad with the use of 
arson besides previously mentioned methods.64
4.5.  Vehicle Terror
Seemingly, vehicle terror is the most modern 
method in the repertoire of terror, however, we 
should again broaden our focus from Europe to 
the Palestinian-Israeli65 and the Middle-Eastern66 
regions where driving into the crowd of civilians 
or military personnel is much more frequent.
One of the online magazines of IS, the 
Rumiyah (Arabic for Rome) has introduced a 
section “Just terror tactics”, dedicated to training 
militants on how to launch cheap terror attacks. 
Previous edition (issue 3) have included a 
tutorial on how to launch the most effective truck 
62 “Al-Qaeda blamed for Europe-wide forest fires”, The 
Telegraph, 2012, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/worldnews/al-qaeda/9585098/Al-Qaeda-blamed-
for-Europe-wide-forest-fires.html, accessed on 17.03.2017
63 Milan Schreuer, Arson at Belgian Forensic Lab May 
Set Back Terrorism Cases, 2016, available at https://www.
nytimes.com/2016/09/22/world/europe/belgium-arson-
forensic-lab-terrorism.html, accessed on 17.03.2017
64 IS, Rumiyah – issue 5, 2017, pp.8-9. Available at https://
azelin.files.wordpress.com/2017/01/rome-magazine-5.pdf, 
accessed on 17.03.2017.
65 Source for example: “Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs”, 
Wave of terror 2015-2017, 2017, available at http://mfa.gov.
il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Terrorism/Palestinian/Pages/Wave-
of-terror-October-2015.aspx, accessed on 17.03.2017.
66 Source for example: Kevin Cooper, Emily Anagnostos, 
Iraq Situation Report: November 9-17, 2016, Institute for 
the Study of War, available at http://www.understandingwar.
org/sites/default/files/iraq%20SITREP%202016-11-
17%20PDF.pdf, accessed on 17.03.2017.
ramming attack. 
When observing details of European attacks 
with a truck on civilians, we have to acknowledge 
the serious influence of media propaganda on 
foreign radicals. Every detail that have been 
written in the issue were more-or-less fulfilled 
in the attack. On the 14th July in Nice, an IS 
follower (Mohamed Lahouaiej Bouhlel) leaft 85 
dead and several hundreds wounded, showing 
the devastating potential of a lone-actor attack. 
A half year later, the Tunisian asylum-seeker 
Anis Amri, the attacker of the Berlin Christmas 
market left 12 people killed when rammed into 
the shoppig street with a truck67.
Vehicle terror is understandably a hardly 
noticeable way for law enforcement agencies, 
since trucks and vehicles are in daily use, 
hijacking them or renting a new one should not 
cost more than a several tens of dollars.
4.6. Cyberterrorism
In addition to the acts of violence presented 
above, there are also numerous other types 
of violence that emerged in the 21st century. 
Terrorist groups have increased their ability to 
extort modern technology, thereby besides the 
easy flow of online propaganda, cyberterrorism 
became a continuously renewable and hardly 
controllable asset of radical groups. 
The cost of such an attack is relatively low, 
the basic needs involve an easily assembled PC 
and internet connection. Even though hacking 
skills require motivation and a previous high 
level knowledge about a series of hacking 
methods; in the modern world, these factors are 
easily accessible, through free online courses or 
by lectures from a professional. 
Even though countries expand their counter-
terrorism assets, the need to refresh cyber-defence 
is so acute, that unless sums are set aside directly 
for this aspect, keeping up the rhythm with the 
accelerated modernization of cyber terrorism 
is hardly possible. In this regard, cyberattacks 
mean an assimetric challenge, where the cost of 
attacks are considerably smaller than countering 
67 Kate Connolly, Chris Stephen, “Berlin attack suspect 
Anis Amri had been on watchlist since January”, The 
Guardian, 2016, available at https://www.theguardian.
com/world/2016/dec/21/berlin-attack-suspect-anis-amri-
under-monitoring-since-january, accessed on 07.03.2017.
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them. This type of terrorism is not as high 
profile as other types of terrorist attacks, but 
its impact can be very destructive, considering 
that critical infrastructure, political and military 
communications, social services and other vital 
aspects of a state might be in risk.
Conclusion - Results of the Changed Nature 
of Terrorism
The number of terrorist attacks is in a global 
increase. Conflict zones and their effects on 
the near-surrounding and farther lying states 
shape the perception and presence of terrorism 
worldwide given the time, where internal 
conflicts’ bursting balloons are combined with 
global fear, aggression and various interests. 
We thereby in the defence industry may not 
stick to our well-established conventional way to 
solve crises; continuous adaptation to the current 
security challenges and environment is a must.
Countering conventional threats today 
have both the organizational background (e.g. 
NATO and national defence institutions) and 
the improving equipment capabilities. However, 
when we consider the modern tendencies, the 
intangible nature of terrorism became such 
an underlying problem, that law enforcement 
agencies and counter-terrorism units not only 
have to modernize their set of tools but also their 
thinking. Namely, because the use of methods that 
are detectable through existing policing systems 
are decreasing, while paralelly, undetectable, 
unconventional, hardly predictable methods 
are in rise. As a tendency, we may add, that the 
massive, well-planned strike on the European 
region has, largely, been replaced by a series of 
lone wolves-attacks on a minimal budget.
Although detection and monitoring of such 
attacks became more difficult for responsible 
agencies, our duty is to prevent and prepare. In this 
relevancy, we have to highlight the importance of 
preparatory trainings (for example, close combat 
trainings or the application of alarming systems) 
for civilians as well, such as the security guards of 
social institutions, critical infrastructure or basic 
social meeting points (e.g. shopping malls).
In this analysis, I aimed to highlight the issue 
of easily accessible, not prohibited equipment for 
a possible strike on Europe, because the effects 
of low-budgeted preparations appear globally. 
We have to think about possible solutions for the 
problematics of such tendencies and in parallel, 
we should not forget the fight against global 
radicalization and the flow of terrorist ideologies. 
Although policing and counter-terrorism 
agencies’ work in the past years were unable to 
prevent some attempts against countries – such 
as the Paris or Brussels bombing, or knife-attacks 
against civilians and police – we also have to take 
into account those foiled plots, that were less-
spread in the media. A total of 211 failed, foiled 
or incompleted attacks were reported by six EU 
Member States in 2015, and almost half of them 
(103) by the UK68. 
At the end of my analysis, I would like to reach 
back to the proverb of Sun-Tzu, presented in the 
beginning of the analysis. While the terrorist 
strikes happen at a certain time, in a certain 
location, the hardships come with their butterfly-
effects, such as disruption of social perception 
of stability and the rise of xenophobia. As Sun-
Tzu years back described, with killing one, they 
frighten thousands. The nature of terrorism 
recent years infiltrated our perception of security. 
Keeping in mind that recent methods are a 
reflection of a mainly realist policy of terrorist 
groups and their leader individuals, we have to 
trust counter-terrorsim and intelligence units, 
develop the corresponding system of prevention 
and on our level accept, adapt and answer to the 
existing security challenges. 
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